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“THE LAST ACCEPTABLE PREJUDICE”:
STUDENT HARASSMENT OF GAY PUBLIC SCHOOL
TEACHERS
Matthew D. Bernstein
“Teachers can motivate students only if they themselves are motivated.
They can make students feel valued and secure only if they feel valued
and secure; they can foster enthusiasm for learning in students only if
they are enthusiastic about teaching. The school culture can make or
break a teacher in the same way that the classroom culture can support
or undermine students' efforts to learn.”
—Deborah Stipek, Motivation to Learn: From Theory to
Practice1
“It’s my last closet. And I don’t think I’ll feel one hundred percent okay
until I don’t have closets in my life. That would be my ultimate dream.”
—Anonymous high school teacher, Oregon2

ABSTRACT
In the United States, where the “marketplace of ideas” is a key social
philosophy, few Americans receive the benefits of attending public
schools with “out” gay and lesbian teachers. Even in an era where civil
rights for homosexual public employees are increasing, more than one
quarter of adults in the United States continue to believe that school
boards should be permitted to fire teachers known to be homosexual.
Amid a permissive legal climate that too easily puts aside the rights of
teachers in a myopic focus on students, incidents where students harass
teachers based on the teachers’ sexual orientation go virtually
unpunished. Although these cases are seldom litigated, they promote a
closeted culture of silence in a profession that employs more than one
million Americans, and they represent a significant fissure in the civil
rights landscape. The anti-gay movement, drawing on a long legacy of
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Albuquerque, New Mexico, where he represents children in child welfare and special
education cases. Prior to law school, he taught history, English, and economics at
Amy Biehl Charter High School in Albuquerque. He sends deep gratitude to Steven
K. Homer, Susan Bernstein, Jerome Bernstein, and Hannah Bloom.
1
DEBORAH STIPEK, MOTIVATION TO LEARN: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE (2002).
2
RITA M. KISSEN, THE LAST CLOSET: THE REAL LIVES OF GAY AND LESBIAN
TEACHERS xvii (Heinemann 1996).
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discrimination, perversely employs notions of morality and role
modeling to enforce a culture of heteronormativity and bigotry in
schools. Without adequate gay and lesbian role models, students cannot
be active participants in the multiple social locations and spheres that
form the lived experience of citizenship. While states are increasingly
protecting homosexual public employees through non-discrimination
statutes, only federal guidance in the form of Title VII protection or a
national non-discrimination statute are sufficient to properly shield
teachers and institute a truly democratic American classroom.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE DUAL CLASSROOM
How many of your teachers were gay? 3 Your answer to this
question is highly conditioned by the time and place in which you grew
up, by the extent to which it made sense for your teachers to conceal
their homosexuality, and by society’s reactions to those teachers brave
enough to be publicly out.4 So unless you attended high school in the
last ten years, you likely formed the impression that gay people simply
did not teach in the public schools.
Today, there are over one million public school teachers
working in the United States.5 Hundreds of them are able to express
multiple pieces of their identity, including their sexual orientation.6 We
have come a long way since 1977, when the Supreme Court of
Washington could find that an admission of homosexuality connotes
illegal and immoral acts in the public workplace because a teacher who
engages in “sexual gratification with a member of [his] own sex” has
“made a voluntary choice for which he must be held morally
responsible.”7 In 2013, almost half the states have banned workplace
discrimination based on sexual orientation, and many also prohibit
discrimination based on gender identity.8 Thousands of schools sponsor
gay-straight alliances that fight bullying and homophobia.9 And many

3

For brevity and variety, I will use the terms gay and homosexual interchangeably.
This paper focuses exclusively on public, secondary school teachers. As indicated,
the umbrella term teachers may also include guidance counselors and other school
employees who work directly with students.
4
I graduated from high school in 1996, and I knew of no teachers of mine who were
gay.
5
Figure is for secondary teachers. Nat. Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Digest of Education
Statistics,
Inst.
of
Educ.
Sci.,
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d11/tables/dt11_070.asp (last visited Feb. 23,
2014).
6
The phrasing here is mean to reflect that each human is made up of multiple identities,
and essentializing people based on their sexual orientation negates their depth. I see
sexual orientation as breaking down into categories such as gay, lesbian, and bisexual,
but also indicating a person’s wider self-conception or way of viewing the world.
7
Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 559 P.2d 1340, 1342, 1346 (Wash. 1977)
(sitting en banc) (internal quotations omitted).
8
Gay,
Lesbian,
& Straight
Education
Network,
Who
We
Are,
http://glsen.org/learn/about-glsen (last visited Apr. 17, 2014).
Human Rights Campaign, Employment Non-Discrimination Laws on Sexual
Orientation
and
Gender
Identity,
http://preview.hrc.org/issues/workplace/equal_opportunity/4844.html (last visited
Apr. 30, 2013).
9
Gay, Lesbian & Straight Education Network [“GLSEN”], Number of Gay-Straight
Alliance
Registrations
Passes
3,500,
http://www.glsen.org/cgibin/iowa/all/news/record/2100.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2013).
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students live with the knowledge that they may marry whomever they
choose and receive state and federal recognition of the benefits of
marriage.10
Nevertheless, the public school still exists as a forum for abuse.11
Today, more than one quarter of adults in the United States continue to
believe that school boards should be permitted to fire teachers known to
be homosexual.12 As has been the case since the origins of the public
education system in the United States, the ability of teachers to lead free
and happy lives is starkly shaped by the social context in which they
work. Many teachers remain closeted, harassed, or in fear of losing their
jobs due to their sexual orientation. The shadow of our federal
lawmakers’ refusal to institute nationwide protections for all sexual
orientations through laws such as the Employment Non-Discrimination
Act hangs over all governmental employees.13 While the attitudes and
cultural beliefs of individuals play a central role in the failure of
Congress to protect people from discrimination and violence based on
sexual orientation, inequity in the law also significantly molds the
ideological landscape.
Gay teachers work every day in a kind of legal limbo:
inadequately protected by laws designed to stop discrimination and
bigotry, like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act14 and the Equal Protection
Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, and without a body of case law
to defend their rights to speech, expression, and privacy under the First
Amendment.15 Even tort law, a common last refuge for legal recourse,
provides little relief for gay teachers. Despite significant progress,
courts have not successfully delineated the full range of rights

10

As this paper goes to press, thirty-five states and the District of Columbia allow gay
marriage. States, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/ (last
visited Nov. 22, 2014).
11
“Forum for abuse” is the terminology of Theresa J. Bryant, May We Teach
Tolerance? Establishing the Parameters of Academic Freedom in Public Schools, 60
U. PITT. L. REV. 579, 586 (1999). Quotations are omitted from main text for
readability.
12
Views About Whether School Boards Should be Able to Fire Gay Teachers, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, http://www.peoplepress.org/2012/06/04/section-6-religion-and-social-values/6-4-12-v-80/ (last visited
Feb. 23, 2014).
13
Employment Non-Discrimination Act, S. 2238, 103rd Cong. (1994) through S. 811,
112th Cong. (2011).
14
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
15
U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV Teachers are also regulated by the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (currently called “No Child Left Behind”),
state Constitutional protections, state and federal anti-discrimination laws, union
contracts, and local school board rules.
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guaranteed to GLBT educators.16 Public schools remain bastions of
conservatism, on pace to be some of the last public places of
employment where people who identify as homosexual can live and
work free from fear. This paper investigates the social construction of
the public school classroom in an attempt to explain why that is the case
and what this phenomenon means for the future.
Legal scholarship surrounding sexual orientation in schools is
capacious and incisive.17 Most scholars focus on gay teachers’ freedom
of expression outside of work, their ability to resist discriminatory
treatment by their districts in hiring and firing, restrictions on discussing
their sexual orientations, or constraints on teaching inclusive
curriculum. Little attention has been paid to incidents where gay
teachers are harassed directly. This kind of harassment only rarely
surfaces in the legal system, especially when the perpetrators are
students.
Student-on-teacher harassment occurs when hatred
emboldens a reversal of control; students take social power and drive
teachers out of their assigned capacities as role models, moral
authorities, and autonomous individuals possessing inalienable rights.
By examining the legal system’s understanding of student-on-teacher
harassment, this paper seeks to expose the persistent homophobia
concealed under the progressive gay rights veneer steadily emerging in
the United States. I argue that state anti-discrimination statues are not
sufficient; federal protection of public employees on the basis of their
sexual orientation is urgent and essential.
The case of Tommy Schroeder offers a crucial case study.
Schroeder was a fifteen-year veteran teacher in the Hamilton School
District, near Milwaukee, Wisconsin, when the harassment began that
ended his teaching career and drove him to court.18 In 1990, Schroeder
began teaching sixth grade at Templeton Middle School in Hamilton.19
Eventually, he revealed his homosexuality to his fellow staff members
and at a public meeting.20 Beginning in the 1993-94 school year,

16

Susanne E. Eckes & Martha M. McCarthy, GLBT Teachers: The Evolving Legal
Protections, 45 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 530, 530 (2008).
17
See Bryant, supra note 11; Todd A. DeMitchell et al. Sexual Orientation and the
Public School Teacher, 19 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 65 (2009); Eva DuBuisson, Teaching
from the Closet: Freedom of Expression and Out-Speech by Public School Teachers,
85 N.C.L. REV. 301 (2006); Kenneth L. Karst, Law, Cultural Conflict, and the
Socialization of Children, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 967 (2003); and Anthony E. Varona,
Setting the Record Straight: The Effects of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act
of 1997 on the First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights of Gay and Lesbian Public
Schoolteachers, 6 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 25 (1998).
18
Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 948 (7th Cir. 2002).
19
Id.
20
Id.
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according to an opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, “Schroeder began receiving unpleasant inquiries and
crude, occasionally cruel, taunts from students regarding his
homosexuality.”21 The harassment became increasingly brutal, and
continued for many years. It came from colleagues, parents, and
students at each of the schools where Schroeder worked.22 Schroeder
reported the abuse on multiple occasions, and school officials
disciplined the students involved.23 However, because much of the
harassment was anonymous, the associate principal at one school told
Schroeder that there wasn’t much she could do.24 After he requested a
transfer several times, the district eventually moved Schroeder to
Lannon Elementary School in the fall of 1996.25 But after a year with
no harassment, the taunts resumed at Lannon, and increased in
ferocity.26

21

Id.
For example, the father of a student told Schroeder, “I don't want queers teaching
my son.” Id. at 956 n.2. One teacher claimed that Schroeder’s former lover had died
of AIDS, while another called him “a flaming homosexual.” Id. at 956. Schroeder
nonetheless refused to disclose the names of staff members who harassed him. Id.
Most of the abuse, however, came from students. “An eighth-grade student called him
a ‘stupid faggot,’ and told him that he was ‘going to blow [his] ... head off.’” Id. at
948 n.1. A student complained that “the gay man” had disciplined her. Id. Another
student told him, “How sad there are any gays in the world.” Id. Students openly
discussed Schroeder's sexuality during homeroom. Id. Other students claimed
Schroeder had AIDS. Id. He was frequently called “faggot.” Id. at 948-49. A student
physically confronted Schroeder, he heard catcalls in the school hallways, students
shouted epithets at him while he was on bus duty, he received prank phone calls from
students chanting “faggot, faggot, faggot,” and he found bathroom graffiti calling him
a “faggot” and “describing, in the most explicit and vulgar terms, the type of sexual
acts they presumed he engaged in with other men.” Id. at 948-49.
23
Id. at 949.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id. At Lannon, most of the abuse came from adults. One parent called him a
pedophile, which Schroeder’s principal took seriously enough to raise the possibility
of “proximity supervision” (restricting Schroeder from being alone with male
students). Id. Another parent said, “Mr. Schroeder openly admitted at a district
meeting that he was homosexual. Is that a good role model for our 5-, 6- and 7-yearold children?” Id. Staff members and parents called him a pedophile and accused him
of sexually abusing boys. Id. One parent removed his child from Schroeder's class
because of Schroeder's homosexuality. Someone slashed the tires on Schroeder's car.
He received anonymous phone calls at home whose callers said things such as “Faggot,
stay away from our kids” and “We just want you to know you ... queer that when we
pull out all our kids, you will have no job.” Id.
22
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In February of 1998, Schroeder had a mental breakdown and
resigned his position.27 He applied for medical leave and long-term
disability insurance, but the district terminated his employment at the
conclusion of the 1998-1999 school year.28 Schroeder then brought
claims against the school district and school administrators, pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they violated his right to equal protection
by failing to take reasonable measures to prevent students, parents, and
staff members, from harassing him on the basis of his sexual
orientation.29 The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Wisconsin granted summary judgment for the defendants.30
Schroeder appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which
affirmed, and the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari.31
The Schroeder opinion is shocking in how quickly the Seventh
Circuit shut down Schroeder’s claimed rights, one by one. The court
systematically sealed off from liability all parties involved in
Schroeder’s harassment. It cited, as justification, a shortage of school
resources, the state interest in protecting students above teachers, a lack
of faith in staff trainings around sexual orientation discrimination, the
blamelessness of minor students, and the unavailability of parents.32 It
also injected sexuality into Schroeder’s identity, labeling him, in effect,
radioactive.33 In the end, the Schroeder court sent a clear message:
provided schools make a minimum effort to punish the students
identified as the perpetrators, no one holds legal responsibility for this
kind of harassment. The students are blameless, the parents cannot be
controlled, and the schools are too strapped for money and time to be on
the hook for the wrongs suffered by their employees. The teachers will,
in the words of Schroeder’s first principal, “just have to ignore it.”34
As a society, we cannot ignore this issue, because public school
classrooms are more than simply workplaces for adults. They are also
discursive spaces where citizenship and social identity develop.35 In
fact, the law of the United States and the internal rules of American

Id. The Seventh Circuit noted that Schroeder had a “protracted history of psychiatric
problems,” and, seeming to question its legitimacy, placed Schroeder’s “mental
breakdown” between scare marks.
28
Id. at 949-50. The termination was in accordance with Schroeder’s union’s
collective bargaining agreement.
29
Id. at 948. The court used the term “homosexuality” rather than “sexual orientation.”
30
Id. at 946.
31
Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 537 U.S. 974 (2002).
32
Id.
33
For radioactive concept, see Nan D. Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere:
Beyond the Market Model, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1591, 1608 (2001).
34
Schroeder, 282 F.3d at 949.
35
Hunter, supra note 33, at 1632.
27
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schools share a great deal in common. The behavior of young people is
heavily controlled by administrators outside the classroom and teachers
within it, but classroom outcomes are also influenced by the responses
of adults when students transgress. Students are far from powerless
pawns; they test boundaries constantly. Students and adults collaborate
to impact the working conditions of gay teachers, gay students, and, in
fact, all students. Their relationship is symbiotic and dialectical. Much
of what students carry away from high school has little to do with
curricular content and everything to do with social situations.36 In this
sense, the perpetrators in harassment cases hold enormous power to
reflect and influence community ideals of gay identity, and citizenship
more generally. Civil rights laws, according to Nan Hunter,
acknowledge these concepts in that they “establish a level playing field
and eliminate irrationalities deriving from prejudice.”37 But they also
“provide access to discursive systems that generate a host of regulatory
norms, many extending far beyond the market.”38 These dual functions
of the classroom—their role in the transference of cultural norms and as
one of the largest public workplaces in the nation—should drive our
efforts at protecting gay and lesbian educators.
II. GENDER, MORALITY, AND THE HISTORY OF MEANING IN
SCHOOLS
For more than one hundred years, schools have been a central, if
often overlooked, battleground in the delineation of the rights of
homosexual people. A long ideological history appoints teachers as role
models and moral exemplars and invokes gender expectations, religious
dogma, angst over the sexualization of children, and superstition about
sexual orientation. Historically, teachers who have acted in any way
outside the often narrow boundaries set by school boards, religious
leaders, parents, and courts (read: “community”) risked, at a minimum,
losing their jobs.39 Young people spend most of their lives in school,

36

Unless otherwise noted, ideas in this paragraph come from my experiences as both
a high school student and as a high school teacher.
37
Hunter, supra note 33, at 1630-31.
38
Id.
39
Throughout the 20th century, schools excluded teachers because they were pregnant,
in mixed-race marriages, thought to be Communist, and because they expressed
pacifist views during wartime. Teachers have been regulated in terms of the way they
dressed, their propensity to drink alcohol or play pinball outside of work, and for
substance abuse problems in their personal lives. For a good discussion of these
morality issues, see DeMitchell et al., supra note 17, at 68-79; Varona, supra note 17,
at 29-31.
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and the assumed propensity of students to absorb and copy the ideas,
actions, and habits of teachers—what the Supreme Court called the
“subtle but important influence” over student “perceptions and
values”40—means that teachers have long been held to a higher standard
than most other public employees.41
Regulation of teachers based on their sexual orientation emerges
from this larger impetus to monitor and control gender and morality, but
these accepted cultural tropes often serve as a smokescreen for blatantly
homophobic intentions that have nothing to do with genuine concerns
over the education of children. Teachers work today within a gendered
landscape that impacts and reflects notions of heteronormativity.
Classroom norms date back to “traditional” conceptions of family,
which viewed single female and male teachers with suspicion and
birthed the stereotype of the single female “spinster” and the male
“effeminate bachelor.”42 At various times in United States history,
teachers were systematically dismissed for marrying, remaining
unmarried after having children, getting divorced, or other “moral
lapses.”43 Set against these notions about proper gender roles, the
earliest writings about homosexuality in the 1900s labeled homosexual
educators as deviants who constituted a threat to children.44 These fears
centered on gendered notions of family and related images of
masculinity, femininity, and fears of deviant sexual attitudes.45 While
men initially dominated the profession, today some 76 percent of public
school teachers are female.46
Inextricably tied to the gendered ideology of the classroom were
concepts of proper moral behavior. The Supreme Court declared in
1952 that “a teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There
he shapes the attitude of young minds towards the society in which they

40

Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1979).
DeMitchell et al., supra note 17, at 69; see also Jason R. Fulmer, Dismissing the
"Immoral" Teacher for Conduct Outside the Workplace—Do Current Laws Protect
the Interests of Both School Authorities and Teachers?, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 271, 277
(2002).
42
Pat Griffin & Mathew Ouellett, From Silence to Safety and Beyond: Historical
Trends in Addressing Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender Issues in K-12 Schools, 36
EQUITY & EXCELLENCE IN EDUC. 106, 107 (2003). For an excellent history of gender
in teaching, see also CTR. FOR RESEARCH & EDUC. IN SEXUALITY, S.F. STATE UNIV.,
COMING OUT OF THE CLASSROOM CLOSET: GAY AND LESBIAN STUDENTS, TEACHERS,
AND CURRICULA (Karen M. Harbeck, ed., The Hawoah Press Inc. 1991).
43
DeMitchell et al., supra note 17, at 69-70 (internal quotations omitted).
44
Griffin & Ouellett, supra note 42, at 107.
45
Id. at 107-08.
46
Fast Facts: Teacher Trends, INST. OF EDUC. SCI.: NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/FastFacts/display.asp?id=28 (last visited May 1, 2013);
see also Harbeck, supra note 42, at 105.
41
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live. In this, the state has a vital concern.”47 At the same time, medical
and psychological “experts” were reinforcing the notion that gay people
were morally unfit for teaching. As a result, schools investigated and
fired teachers whom they suspected of being homosexual. The accepted
rationale was that since homosexuals could not reproduce “naturally,”
they had to recruit and corrupt young people to their cause. 48 Morality
clauses in state statues, school board rules, and teacher contracts
reflected these beliefs and affirmed homosexuality as cause for
dismissal.49
Underlying these anti-gay sociolegal manifestations were deep
fears about the performances of gay teachers.50 Social angst about
altering adult gender roles centered on the development of children. If
parenting is about duplicating or perfecting an image of oneself in one’s
(heteronormative) offspring, then parental and school board worries
about how gay adults could come to exist logically centered on
children’s influences.51 If gay people are made, not born, it is natural to
conceive of the classroom as an identity factory where traditional gender
roles are cemented and laid down, held and conceived.52 In this sense,
a gay teacher who “performed” her identity “launche[d] a personal
attack on the heterosexual norm as well as on the stereotypical
perceptions of homosexuality.”53
The conflation of sexual orientation with sexual conduct
emerged from these phobias. At the core of the over-reading of
homosexual aggression—as seen through worries that homosexuals
would molest children, or try to “convert” them to their lifestyle54—is a
deep fear of the opposite: that being homosexual is just fine.55 The
current sociolegal discourse formed, and was formed by, the historical
exclusion of relief from discrimination still found today in the absence

47

Adler v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952); see also
DeMitchell et al., supra note 17, at 105.
48
Varona, supra note 17, at 31.
49
Fulmer, supra note 41, at 275.
50
See Marc R. Poirier, Microperformances of Identity: Visible Same-Sex Couples and
the Marriage Controversy, 15 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 3 (2008)
(performance concept).
51
For the ideas in this section, I am indebted to a series of conversations with Professor
Steven K. Homer. Interviews with Professor Steven K. Homer, Lecturer, Legal
Analysis and Communication, Univ. of N.M. Sch. Of Law (Jan. - Apr., 2013).
52
Id.
53
Jennifer Minear, Performance and Politics: An Argument for Expanded First
Amendment Protection of Homosexual Expression, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
601, 622-23 (2001).
54
Varona, supra note 17, at 41.
55
“[T]he fear that the child may come to self-identify with a group that the parent sees
as culturally Other.” Karst, supra note 17, at 989.
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of anti-discrimination protections for homosexual Americans. The legal
system in the United States has worked to carve away the potential for
positive identity formation in young gay people by preventing teachers
from demonstrating that it is okay, and even fantastic, to be homosexual.
Beginning in 1969, as the social terrain became more combative
across the United States, the culture wars heated up. Homosexuality in
schools became both more visible and more contested. That year, the
California Supreme Court held, in Morrison v. State Board of
Education, that a school board could dismiss a teacher for immoral
conduct or “moral turpitude” only if the behavior in question rendered
her unfit to teach.56 The decision, issued less than a year after the
Stonewall Riots, was the first significant case to hold that morality
clauses were not automatic vehicles for homophobia. Throughout the
1970s, a number of courts weighed in on whether a teacher’s perceived
homosexuality was in itself cause for dismissal, or whether there must
be a nexus between the teacher’s identity and her fitness to teach.57
Most of these courts embraced the idea that homosexual conduct, even
outside the school setting, per se violated state immorality statutes and
provided grounds for dismissal.58 The very essence of a gay teacher,
these decisions suggested, is enough to negatively impact young
people.59
Despite an increase in civil rights generally in the United States
in the mid to late 20th century, social opinion remained broadly

56

Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 390-91 (1969).
See, e.g., Acanfora v. Bd. of Ed. 491 F.2d 498, 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding
that a homosexual teacher was appropriately dismissed because he failed to disclose
on his teaching application his prior membership in the Homophiles of Penn State, a
gay rights group); Burton v. Cascade Sch. Dist. Union High Sch., 353 F. Supp. 254,
255 (D. Or. 1973), aff'd, 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding a state morality statute
unconstitutional that allowed for dismissal of homosexual teacher without requiring a
nexus between homosexuality and teaching performance); Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch.
Dist., 559 P.2d 1340, 1347 (Wash. 1977) (It is important to remember that Gaylord's
homosexual conduct must be considered in the context of his position of teaching high
school students. Such students could treat the retention of the high school teacher by
the school board as indicating adult approval of his homosexuality. It would be
unreasonable to assume as a matter of law a teacher's ability to perform as a teacher
required to teach principles of morality is not impaired and creates no danger of
encouraging expression of approval and of imitation. Likewise to say that school
directors must wait for prior specific overt expression of homosexual conduct before
they act to prevent harm from one who chooses to remain ‘erotically attracted to a
notable degree towards persons of his own sex and is psychologically, if not actually
disposed to engage in sexual activity prompted by this attraction’ is to ask the school
directors to take an unacceptable risk in discharging their fiduciary responsibility of
managing the affairs of the school district (citations omitted)).
58
Eckes & McCarthy, supra note 16, at 535.
59
Id.
57
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intolerant of homosexuality. A 1970 Gallup survey found that more
than 70% of respondents agreed with the statements, “[h]omosexuals
are dangerous as teachers or youth leaders because they try to get
sexually involved with children" or "[h]omosexuals try to play sexually
with children if they cannot get an adult partner."60 Only 27% of
Americans in 1977 would allow gay people to be elementary school
teachers.61
After Stonewall galvanized the gay rights movement in 1969,
anti-gay forces marshaled a backlash. In 1977, singer and beauty queen
Anita Bryant claimed that in Los Angeles, 30,000 students under the age
of 12 were “recruited and sexually abused by homosexuals” because
“since homosexuals cannot reproduce, they must recruit, must freshen
their ranks.”62 Bryant warned of holding up any gay teacher as a role
model.63 In this, she was not just successful, but influential; her
recommendation that states repeal ordinances protecting gays and
lesbians in housing and employment was replicated in Minnesota,
Kansas, Oklahoma, Oregon, and California.64 In Oklahoma, the
legislature passed an initiative in 1978 that allowed schools to fire any
employee who promoted public or private homosexual activity.65
The anti-gay movement drew on a moral authority that sought
to prescribe an authoritative definition of cultural meanings in the
classroom and also to motivate political authority to stop the
liberalization of society.66 It was highly successful. By the 1990s, even
while initiatives to protect gay students emerged in some areas, mistrust
of homosexuals in schools had grown stronger.67 In the 1996 debate
over the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), Senator Don
Nickles, a Republican from Oklahoma, complained that ENDA would
allow homosexual teachers to proselytize in the classroom and promote
promiscuity.68 Not only did ENDA fail, but Congress passed the

60

Facts About Homosexuality and Child Molestation, SEXUAL ORIENTATION: SCI.,
EDUC.,
&
POL’Y,
DEP’T
OF
PSYCHOLOGY
UNIV.
OF
CAL.,
http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/rainbow/html/facts_molestation.html (last visited Feb.
21, 2014).
61
Id.
62
Varona, supra note 17, at 31.
63
Id.; see also Griffin & Ouellett, supra note 42, at 107-08.
64
Varona, supra note 17, at 31.
65
Id. The Tenth Circuit found this statute unconstitutional in 1984; see Nat'l Gay Task
Force v. Bd. of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Bd. of
Educ.. v. Nat'l Gay Task Force, 470 U.S. 903 (1985).
66
See Karst, supra note 17, at 977.
67
Griffin & Ouellett, supra note 42, at 110.
68
Varona, supra note 17, at 25-26.
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Defense of Marriage Act that same year.69 The political right has
continued to find vast success in its ability to “mobilize cultural
constituencies” by focusing on the socialization of children.70
In the last twenty years, as in other areas of public employment
and civil rights, gay teachers have increasingly won victories while
often suffering setbacks. In an era in which the Supreme Court has
found substantive due process privacy rights in the areas of procreation,
marriage, abortion, and the use of contraception, the Court has also
increased its protections of sexuality and sexual orientation.71 The
watershed decisions in Romer v. Evans72 and Lawrence v. Texas73
liberated gay people from the reach of laws meant to punish them simply
on the basis of their identity. Where once homosexuality was
completely invisible in public education, now there is a limited
tolerance. Nonetheless, today thirty-seven states have statutes that
make immorality—a universal signifier for non-heterosexuality—a
legitimate reason for teacher dismissal.74 In many schools, gay teachers
have no fear of persecution, but homophobia is increasingly hidden
behind selectively-applied notions of heteronormative morality and
ideation about “role models.”75 While the closet door remains shut for
many teachers who work in unforgiving communities, students have a
way of prying that door open.
III. ILL-FITTING PRECEDENT
Harassment is a form of discrimination, which, legally speaking,
only exists if it is tied to protected class status.76 Among students,
identity-based harassment is simply called bullying, and one would be
hard pressed to find anyone who explicitly tolerates it. But against
adults, our national laws condone bullying if it is not based on race,

69

Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
Karst, supra note 17, at 969, 971.
71
DeMitchell et al., supra note 17, at 97-101.
72
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (finding that the amendment to the Colorado
Constitution banning protections for homosexuals violated Equal Protection Clause).
73
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding unconstitutional the Texas ban on
homosexual sodomy and overturning Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
74
DeMitchell et al., supra note 17, at 79; see also What Are the Main Rights Teachers
Have in the United States, and Why is it Important..., ENOTES,
http://www.enotes.com/education-reference/teachers-rights (last visited Feb. 21,
2014).
75
See, e.g., Holt v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 685 So. 2d 501 (La. Ct. App. 1996)
(affirming reversal of dismissal of female teacher for sleeping with female student at
slumber party and giving student gifts).
76
Harassment,
U.S.
EQUAL
EMP.
OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION,
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/harassment.cfm (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
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color, religion, sex, or national origin.77 When students harass teachers,
they benefit from an added layer of protection of their anti-gay animus
because students are subject to more lenient legal standards when it
comes to their words and behavior. In effect, the law shields these
student proxies from responsibility for bullying adults and protects
supervisors and parents from wrongs they did not directly commit. This
phenomenon is due to a shallow understanding of schools and to the
historical homophobia, outlined above, camouflaged beneath the
concern for vulnerable young people. Responsibility for stopping the
harassment too often falls back on teachers, with disastrous results.
The most important federal legislation protecting discrimination
in the workplace is the Civil Rights Act of 1964.78 Title VII of the act
makes it unlawful “to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.”79 While Title VII has been successful in preventing workplace
discrimination for the protected classes it explicitly mentions, plaintiffs
seeking safeguards on the basis of their sexual orientation have not been
able to rely on Title VII. Courts have “uniformly rejected the notion
that either sexual orientation or gender identity” are analyzed within the
protections of Title VII.80 Judicial interpretation of Title VII has shifted
radically since the act’s passage, and some plaintiffs in non-teaching
fields have been successful in bringing Title VII “because of…sex”
claims for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.81 However,
no teacher has successfully utilized Title VII in bringing a sexual
orientation harassment claim, and few have bothered to try. What
should be the cornerstone of available remedies is instead a dead end.
Courts have increasingly muddied, rather than clarified, the
exact meaning of “because of…sex” discrimination, often failing to
articulate the important differences and overlaps between sexual
harassment, gender discrimination, and discrimination based on sexual
orientation in decisions that too often run against homosexual
plaintiffs.82 Under Title VII, courts place gay people in a bind: on one
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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, CARLOS A. BALL & JANE S. SCHACTER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 448 (West Publishing, 3rd ed.
2008).
79
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
80
Rubenstein et al., supra note 78, at 449.
81
See, e.g., Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding that
issue of material fact existed as to whether harassment of gay male employee was due
to homosexuality).
82
See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (holding
that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII); Price Waterhouse v.
78
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hand, those who present stereotypically find more success in court than
those who do not; Title VII incentivizes plaintiffs to “act gay.” If they
do not, their harassers can easily claim some other, non-protected basis
for their actions.83 On the other hand, if plaintiffs do present
stereotypically and it is clear the discrimination occurred for this reason,
courts are likely to limit the legal basis of the harassment to sexual
orientation, which, in and of itself, is not a basis for a Title VII claim.84
The fact that none of the teachers facing student harassment in the cases
analyzed here even attempted to rely on Title VII exposes it as a
selective administrator of justice.
Gay teachers have had some success relying on 42 U.S.C. §
1983, which creates a cause of action for constitutional violations.85
Using Section 1983, teachers can seek protections and damages under
the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, the right to free
speech and expression, and the right to privacy. Declarations of
homosexuality (whether the teacher intentionally comes out or
unintentionally “is outed” by someone else) are often the spark for
harassment.86 First Amendment speech and expression claims, applied
through Section 1983, provide one avenue to protect gay teachers in
these circumstances. In fact, Theresa Bryant calls the First Amendment,
“the only protection for teachers, if such protection exists.”87 Jennifer
Minear goes even further, arguing that all homosexual identity should
be seen as expression and thus protected by the First Amendment.88 One
advantage to expression claims is certainly that, in contrast to equal

Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that the company who denied a woman
promotion, telling her to go to “charm school” and act more feminine, stereotyped her
in violation of Title VII); Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th
Cir. 2006) (affirming, under Title VII, casino’s right to compel female employee to
wear makeup); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding
that lesbian hairdresser who claimed discrimination and gender stereotyping under
Title VII was fired for other reasons); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 243 F.3d 1206
(9th Cir. 2001) (affirming that harassment of hotel employee based on his sexual
orientation was not actionable under Title VII).
83
See Dawson, 398 F.3d at 218.
84
“Rene did nothing to show the district court that the harassment was based on his
gender. Instead, he stated quite plainly that the question presented was whether the
conduct he alleged ‘is prohibited by Title VII even though it was directed at [him]
because of his sexual orientation.’” Rene, 243 F.3d at 1210.
85
“Every person who, under color of any statute. . . subjects. . . any citizen of the
United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . ” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
86
See Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1281 (D. Utah 1998).
87
Bryant, supra note 11, at 590.
88
Minear, supra note 53, at 626.
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protection or Title VII, they nominally apply equally to people of all
sexual orientations.89
The free speech and expression approach, however, does not
serve to protect teachers harassed by students. Speech and expression
claims depend upon a two-step process: first, the teacher must be
publicly out(ed), and second, the school or school board must take
identifiable, aggressive actions to limit the teacher’s expression. Once
a gay teacher engages in some kind of out expression, under First
Amendment law, courts analyze three prongs: the extent to which that
performance is a matter of “public concern,”90 whether it is “disruptive”
to the school day,91 or whether it is “reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns.”92 Leaving aside the insult of applying these
tests to a person’s basic identity, scenarios such as these do not fit
situations in which students harass teachers; in those cases, the teacher
is often not out prior to the harassment, and the school board most
commonly does not act.
Because First Amendment jurisprudence places a duty on
homosexuals to officially “come out” in some symbolic or substantive
way before assigning protection, it turns the closet inside out. It places
the burden on the victim rather than the perpetrator. While it is an
admirable goal that all gay and lesbian teachers freely express who they
are, to require “out” behavior prior to legal protection reinforces
stereotypes that somehow sexuality is more essential in the identities of
gay people than it is for heterosexuals. Since heterosexuality is the
default, invisible identity, no straight person needs to make a show of
declaring his sexual preference—heterosexuality is simply assumed.
Moreover, it is not relevant whether teachers harassed for their sexual
orientation actually are gay or not: the salient issue is that the
perpetrators have decided they are.
Under the First Amendment, it may also be difficult to prove that
a school administration acted against a teacher because of sexual
orientation or for another reason. Wendy Weaver’s case demonstrates
many of the drawbacks to First Amendment claims, despite the fact that
she is perhaps the most successful plaintiff in a harassment case.
Weaver was a veteran teacher and volleyball coach at Spanish Fork

89

Equal protection sets up a hierarchy of protected classes and holds race as more
important than sexual orientation, while Title VII simply excludes sexual orientation
protections altogether.
90
Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
91
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969).
92
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273, (1988).
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High School in Spanish Fork, Utah, with an unblemished reputation.93
When a student and volleyball player asked Weaver if she was gay,
Weaver said simply, “yes.”94 Parents and students suddenly began
complaining about her and Weaver’s sexual orientation became a topic
openly discussed by the principal, the school board, and even Weaver’s
ex-husband.95 One of her players and that player’s parents told the
principal that the girl would not play under Weaver.96 Weaver was then
let go as volleyball coach and told that she could not discuss her
“homosexual orientation or lifestyle” at school, and “if students, staff
members, or parents of students ask about your sexual orientation or
anything concerning the subject, you shall tell them that the subject is
private and personal and inappropriate to discuss with them.”97 The
district reminded Weaver that she was “always perceived by the student
as a teacher, authority figure and role model.”98 Weaver brought suit
under Section 1983, alleging that the school had violated her right to
free speech under the First Amendment, and that her dismissal as coach
violated the Equal Protection Clause.99 She prevailed on summary
judgment on all counts, with the court finding that her sexual orientation
was “a matter of public concern.”100
It is unclear, however, to what extent the Weaver decision
should represent a victory in teacher harassment cases. Weaver is less
about a teacher’s right to assert her sexuality freely than it is about a
school’s ability to publicly shame a teacher as a form of harassment. In
this case, rather than any student directly attacking Weaver, the school
board and parents relied on the school administration to hold the nucleus
of the homophobia. If the school had not taken clear and documented
steps, in writing, to suppress Weaver’s expression of her sexual
orientation—if, instead, it had stood by passively while others inflicted
the damage—Weaver would have had shaky legal ground on which to
stand. Wendy Weaver’s case is a useful paradigm to show just how
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As a teacher, she consistently received excellent evaluations. As a coach, Weaver
led her team to four state championships. Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d
1279, 1280 (D. Utah 1998).
94
Id. at 1281.
95
Id. at 1286.
96
Id. at 1281.
97
Id. at 1281-82.
98
Id. at 1282.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 1284. But see Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., Montgomery Cnty.,
Ohio, 730 F.2d 444, 449 (6th Cir. 1984) (declaring that teacher’s sexual orientation
was not a matter of public concern).
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direct school involvement in harassment must be to constitute
discrimination.101
IV. JUDICIAL HOMOPHOBIA MADE PLAIN: THE CASE OF TOMMY
SCHROEDER
Tommy Schroeder’s case, by contrast, symbolizes the enormous
power students hold to express community homophobia and come away
virtually without reproach. The Seventh Circuit handed down
Schroeder in 2002, six years after Romer102 and one year before
Lawrence.103 These two cases opened the door to fundamental rights
for gay and lesbian Americans by declaring, for the first time, that
government animus against homosexuals was irrational.104 However,
as Katherine M. Franke explains, Romer and Lawrence also “[did] little
to open up new forms of public and private sexual intelligibility that are
not always already domestinormative.…The world post-Lawrence
remains invested in forms of social membership and, indeed, citizenship
that are structurally identified with domesticated heterosexual marriage
and intimacy.”105 Tommy Schroeder fell victim to a court only willing
to go so far in recognizing the legitimacy of homosexuality. His case
demonstrates the limited reach of the Romer-Lawrence era.
As mentioned in the Introduction above, Schroeder took what
feels like an intuitive path to face his district’s poor response to student

Weaver’s foes also used the courts themselves to harass her. In a separate case
brought against her shortly after she filed her own complaint, a group of parents calling
themselves the “Citizens of Nebo School District for Moral and Legal Values” accused
Weaver of violating various state statutes concerning the conduct of teachers. Miller
v. Weaver, 66 P.3d 592, 594 (2003). The group accused Weaver of administering
personality tests to her students, discussing the results of those tests in class, requiring
her students to interpret their dreams in class, and disparaging the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints. The group also said Weaver “encouraged students to
question traditional sources of authority and determine for themselves whether
alternative ‘lifestyles’ are right or wrong.” Id. The Utah Supreme Court eventually
dismissed all complaints, granted Weaver her costs, and agreed with the district court’s
assessment of the plaintiffs’ “utter failure to address the substance of the [district
court's] ruling.” Id.
102
See supra note 72.
103
See supra note 73.
104
“The Romer decision highlights a judicial shift from considering animus against
homosexuals to be an acceptable government rationale, to treating it like any other
racial, ethnic, or religious bias.” DuBuisson, supra note 17, at 329 (citing Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (holding “private biases may be outside the reach of
the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect”)).
105
Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 1399, 1415-16 (2004).
101
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harassment: he brought a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.106 Seen as the centerpiece of
constitutional protection of individual rights, Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment avers that no state shall “deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”107 Equal
protection requires that all groups of people be treated similarly. 108 If
the state makes a law that more heavily burdens one classification of
people above another, it must demonstrate at minimum a rational basis
for doing so. If the classification is deemed protected, the state has a
higher burden to meet in its justification for the imbalance in treatment.
Courts have not identified sexual orientation as a protected class.
In Schroeder, the court applied rational basis review, citing both
Romer and Bowers v. Hardwick.109 In order to establish an equal
protection violation, then, the court found that Schroeder must show that
the defendants “(1) treated him differently from others who were
similarly situated, (2) intentionally treated him differently because of
his membership in the class to which he belonged (i.e., homosexuals),
and (3) . . . that the discriminatory intent was not rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.”110 The court attacked Schroeder’s case on all
three prongs and found that a rational basis for the district’s treatment
of him did exist.111
First, the court invalidated Schroeder’s definition of “similarly
situated” and the significance of his class membership.112 Lacking any
clear examples of other out teachers that the district treated differently,
Schroeder based his disparate treatment claim, in part, on the fact that
administrators had handled a spate of racial incidents at the school much
more urgently than they had his situation.113 The court found, however,

106

Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 948 (7th Cir. 2002).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
108
For equal protection analysis, see, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35
(1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
109
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding Georgia’s anti-sodomy
statute). Overruled one year later in Lawrence.
110
Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 950 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal
citations omitted).
111
Id. at 959.
112
Id. at 953.
113
“Schroeder would have us infer differential treatment because: (1) a memorandum
circulated by the associate principal at Templeton, Patty Polczynski, failed to address
and condemn the widespread use by students of ‘hetero-sexist’ and ‘anti-gay’
comments in the same manner that a previous memorandum had done with respect to
racist comments and symbols, and (2) while the Hamilton School District held several
district-wide staff/teacher training sessions and conducted annual student orientation
programs to implement its policies prohibiting race and sex discrimination, the district
107
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that it was not enough for Schroeder to show that racial incidents were
treated differently than those involving sexual orientation. Instead, he
needed to prove that he was treated differently from other teachers.114
Unlike in Wendy Weaver’s case, where the court found significance in
the fact that the district limited her speech and not the speech of
heterosexual teachers, the acts of harassment in Schroeder resulted not
from the district’s actions, but from its failure to act when presented
with the actions of others (i.e. the often anonymous students and parents
who victimized Schroeder). Faced with no way to prove the absurd—
that the district had not failed to take the necessary steps to stop the
harassment of heterosexual teachers—Schroeder attempted to show
disparate treatment across classifications (i.e. race vs. sexual
orientation).
But since courts apply strict scrutiny to racial
classifications but only rational basis to sexual orientation—in effect
placing more value on bigotry founded on race than bigotry founded on
sexual orientation—the court was unimpressed.115 Richard Posner
concurred specifically to make the point that even if Schroeder were
right that the district handled racial harassment differently, he still could
not prove that the state’s actions were “irrational.”116
Rather than look comparatively to the manner in which the
district treated various teachers, under the state’s interest prong the court
majority found it appropriate to examine the district’s treatment of
teachers against the interests of students, and it approached this
comparison as a zero-sum game. The court explicitly noted that “in a
school setting, the well-being of students, not teachers, must be the
primary concern of school administrators.”117 It found that young
children are “more vulnerable to intimidation and mockery than
teachers with advanced degrees and 20 years of experience,”118 and that
school officials should be cautious about using “draconian”119 “police
tactics”120 to remedy nonviolent harassment of a teacher by students,

never held similar training sessions or student programs to address sexual orientation
discrimination.” Id. at 952.
114
Id.
115
“From a historical standpoint the core violation of the Equal Protection Clause is
indeed the selective withdrawal of police protection from a disfavored group, as the
term ‘equal protection of the laws’ connotes. . ..But Schroeder is no more a woman
than he is a black. He is a white male.” Id. at 957.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 952. Posner echoed these words in his concurrence: “a public school's
primary commitment is to its students, not to its teachers.” Id. at 958.
118
Id. at 952.
119
Id. at 956.
120
Id. at 953.
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“even though the harassment is offensive and cruel.”121 The court also
assumed that the school could play no role in teaching tolerance because
“it is hard to see how teaching the district's teachers and staff about
sexual orientation discrimination would have prevented the primary
perpetrators, the students and their parents, from harassing him.”122 It
found that while the actions against Schroeder—which were punished
when possible—were relevant, their “underlying motivation” was
not.123
The key to the legal blamelessness of the school district to stop
the harassment, in the court’s eyes, was the school’s lack of control over
parents. “Obviously, if a child picks up foul language and prejudicial
views from his parents at home, and then displays them at school, he
should be disciplined,” Manion wrote.124 The court’s equation of
prejudicial views with simple foul language treated the parent’s role in
transmuting hatred as irrelevant to the assignation of blame. In essence,
the court vindicated parents’ fundamental right to instill bigotry in their
children. Despite the fact that none of the briefs mention religious
freedom in the Schroeder case, Manion injected this concept into his
thinking, writing that a student “cannot . . . be disciplined for expressing
a home-taught religious belief that homosexual acts are immoral . . . the
Equal Protection Clause does not require a school district to do anything
about parental unpleasantries unless they take place on school
grounds.”125
Central to the court’s logic on all of these counts was the notion
that there are simply not enough resources to stop the harassment of one
teacher, regardless of its basis. Because this appeared to be a single,
isolated case, the Schroeder court cited Sixth Circuit precedent126 to say
that the district had no obligation to get involved.127 In his concurrence,
Judge Posner agreed, arguing that we simply don’t have time to protect
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Id. It is not clear to which tactics the court refers—presumably it means the
sensitivity training that Schroeder requested.
122
Id. at 954.
123
Id. at 955. Distinguishing Nabozny, a case of brutal student-on-student harassment
that Schroeder cited in his brief, Posner pointed out that in Nabozny the assaults were
physical and the neglect by school officials—who literally laughed when Nabozny
complained—were easy to see. Id. at 958-59.
124
Id. at 955.
125
Id. Ironically, later in its own opinion, the court warns against federal judges’ use
of rational basis review as “a mechanism to impose their own social values on public
school administrators who already have innumerable challenges to face.” Id. at 956.
126
Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 30001 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that Cincinnati had rational basis in conserving costs in
passing Romer-like ban on rights for homosexuals).
127
Schroeder, 282 F.3d at 954.
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gay teachers, just as we can’t protect every “overweight, or undersized,
or nerdish, or homely” employee.128 Moreover, according to Posner, for
the district to have added a prohibition against anti-gay language in its
memo to teachers at Schroeder’s school would have “diluted” the
overall effect of the anti-bigotry message.129
This barely-hidden disgust for homosexuality pervades
Manion’s majority and Posner’s concurrence. Both judgments equate
sexual orientation with sexual acts in a circular argument that blames
Schroeder for his own purported sexual promiscuity. Manion found that
“there is no simple way of explaining to young students why it is wrong
to mock homosexuals without discussing the underlying lifestyle or
sexual behavior associated with such a designation.”130 Posner referred
to Schroeder’s sexual orientation or “activity,” which he said led to the
school’s “understandable reticence about flagging issues of sex for
children.”131 Both men’s words inject sexuality and sexual acts into
Schroeder’s daily job performance and then lay the blame on Schroeder
for their doing so, demonstrating their belief in what Nan Hunter calls
“the intrinsic uncontrollability of gay male sexuality.”132
The Seventh Circuit’s logic assumes that no student could
understand what it means to love someone of the same sex because no
student could possibly be gay. It obliterates any sense that gay people
are part of a community that includes non-gay people or that
heterosexual members of that community might also benefit from
stopping bigotry aimed at their friends, family, and colleagues. It
scrubs the history of gay rights from the possible list of classroom
topics. And it reflects an epistemological inability to conceive of sexual
orientation apart from heterosexuality, grounded in a permanent
stigmatization of homosexuals. Put simply, the Schroeder opinion is a
state vehicle for the very same bullying that Tommy Schroeder asked it
to stop. Writing in the 21st century, Posner and Manion echo ideology
that is hundreds of years old in claiming that there is something unique
in the homosexual “lifestyle.” To speak of love, as is the most common
way of explaining to children why coupledom of any kind occurs,
appears beyond their vocabulary. In one fell swoop, the Schroeder court

128

Id. at 958 (Posner, J., concurring).
Id.
130
Id. at 954. To push Posner’s stance to its logical conclusion, one wonders whether,
if we were talking about students who were harassing a female teacher who had just
gotten married, it would be possible to explain that it was not okay to tease her without
talking about sex.
131
Id. at 958.
132
Hunter, supra note 33, at 1607.
129
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defined homosexual teachers and students out of full American
citizenship.133
V. LEGAL CONFUSION: JOAN LOVELL AND AN ELUSIVE HOSTILE
WORK ENVIRONMENT
The Schroeder opinion is valuable in that the men who wrote it
had the courage to place their bold rationales in plain sight. It stands as
a symbol of a shockingly outdated sociolegal logic. By contrast, the
case of Joan Lovell illustrates what happens when courts with a genuine
interest in stopping sexual orientation harassment reach, albeit
unsuccessfully, for the legal backing to do so.
Lovell worked as an art teacher for the Comsewogue school
district in New York for 27 years without discussing her sexuality with
anyone in the district.134 In 2001, three female students in her class
complained that Lovell was “looking at them in a sexual manner or saw
Lovell looking at one of their friends.”135 Lovell’s principal
investigated the students’ claims, discovered them to be false, and
transferred the students out of Lovell’s class.136 He also, however, gave
one student a grade of 100% in Lovell’s class, and took no disciplinary
action against the students.137 A number of incidents followed in which
various students in the school harassed Lovell. One called her a “dyke,”
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Posner concluded that there was no evidence that the school authorities were hostile
to Schroeder at all, let alone due to his sexual orientation “although the character of
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F.3d at 957 (Posner, J., concurring). Posner in particular, threw up his hands, writing
that “while in hindsight it appears that the defendants could have done more to protect
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P. Wood, writing in dissent in Schroeder, harshly criticized the majority opinion:
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Yet both the majority opinion and the concurrence see no problem in the fact that the
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another called her “disgusting,” students whispered and pointed at her
as she walked through the halls, and two female students hugged each
other in mock fear when they saw her.138 Still, her principal failed to
take remedial measures.139 More incidents followed. The principal
suspended two students who asked Lovell whether she was a “dyke,”
and told the full class that they were not to discuss the incident.140
Another student called Lovell a “racist,” and when she sent him to the
office, he responded that Lovell “just hate[s] men.”141 Finally, someone
wrote “Lovell is a stupid dyke” on a desk.142 The principal called in the
local police department’s Bias Crime Unit to investigate, but the
perpetrator was never identified.143
After a final incident in which a student falsely accused Lovell
of telling the student to “go home and commit suicide” and a rumor
spread in the student body that Lovell had been fired for doing so, Lovell
saw the school doctor, who diagnosed her with anxiety and
depression.144 Her own doctor diagnosed her with Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder resulting directly from the harassment.145 On June 30,
2003, she went on catastrophic leave and did not return to school for the
rest of the 2003-2004 school year.146
Though Lovell brought her case no further than the district court,
the Lovell opinion provides a synoptic catalogue of the enormous
inconsistency and convoluted interpretations available in these
circumstances. The Lovell court’s explication of nearly every aspect of
her case differed from the Seventh Circuit’s findings in Schroeder.
First, even the basic equal protection analyses the two courts set up is
dissimilar. In framing the legal standards surrounding Lovell’s claim,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
emphasized that to prove a violation by the district, Lovell must show
that she was treated differently from other similarly-situated employees
of the school on the basis of "impermissible considerations" or “by a
malicious or bad faith intent to injure” her.147 Rather than take the
Schroeder court’s approach and examine Lovell’s "membership” in a
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“class” of homosexuals, the Lovell court inquired whether Lovell's case
was “sufficiently similar to others who were harassed by students,
whether the defendants' handling of her situation was sufficiently
different, and whether the explanation for any such difference is
grounded in anti-homosexual animus. . .”148 On a motion for summary
judgment, the court found that the answers to most of these questions
could potentially come out in her favor and declined to grant summary
judgment for the district.149 Where the Seventh Circuit in Schroeder
decided as a question of law that sexual orientation and race were not
comparable, the Lovell court held that these were issues a jury should
decide.150
Lovell’s central claim borrowed Title VII concepts to assert that
her employers created a hostile work environment, but she brought her
case under the Equal Protection Clause.151 This choice drew the court
into opening a Pandora’s Box of conflicting and unsettled legal
precedent leading to confusing results. The likely reason Lovell
implicitly invited the court to import Title VII hostile work analyses into
her equal protection claim was to sidestep the fact that she was not a
member of a protected class under Title VII. Tommy Schroeder had
attempted to make a similar connection in his own harassment case,
which the Seventh Circuit rejected, calling it “a clear violation of the
separation of powers.”152
The Lovell court, however, entertained the idea. In analyzing
Lovell’s claims, it turned to several Title VII cases that center on sexual
harassment and “because of sex” discrimination, not specifically on
sexual orientation harassment. For example, in Quinn v. Nassau County
Police Department, which the Lovell court cited,153 a New York district
court found that a police department had fostered a hostile work
environment by failing to protect a gay officer from harassment.154 The
harassment, however, was sexual in nature, and the court specifically
identified it as such, saying “the Second Circuit has explained that
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sexual harassment can, under certain circumstances, amount to a
constitutional tort.”155 In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., on the other
hand, the Supreme Court heard the case of a plaintiff who brought a
Title VII “because of sex” case to stem discrimination on the basis of
her identity as a woman.156 Lovell looked to this precedent to examine
the extent to which the environment Lovell faced was severe or
hostile.157 Finally, in Annis v. County of Westchester, the Second Circuit
appeared to hold that plaintiffs suing under Section 1983 may import
hostile work environment analyses from Title VII.158 The Lovell court
cited Annis to conclude that “it is well established in this circuit that sexbased discrimination, including sexual harassment, is actionable under
§ 1983 as a violation of equal protection.”159 The Lovell court drew on
this variety of precedents to completely tangle the important legal and
experiential distinctions between sexual harassment, sex-based
discrimination, and sexual orientation harassment.
Despite the court’s confusion, Lovell contains the only attempt
to articulate a legal standard to analyze cases in which students harass
teachers on the basis of sexual orientation. In its review, the court turned
to another New York case, Peries v. New York City Board of Education,
which involved a Title VII claim brought by a teacher of Sri Lankan
descent whose students harassed him for nearly a decade based on his
national origin and race.160 The Peries court found that the authority of
administrators relative to teachers in stemming student abuse was an
issue of first impression.161 While Peries pointed out that the Supreme
Court had ruled in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education that
administrators might be liable if they failed to take action to stop

Id. at 356. “In the Court's view, the United States Constitution and the provisions
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, combined with logic, common sense and fairness dictate the
answer: individuals have a constitutional right under the Equal Protection Clause to be
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student-on-student sexual harassment, “neither the Supreme Court nor
the Second Circuit has extended that right to teachers.”162 The Peries
court distinguished student-on-student harassment and student-onteacher harassment, finding that the most important distinction between
them is that “a victim student has no disciplinary authority over the
harassing student, while a victim teacher wields at least nominal
disciplinary authority.”163 The Peries court found it “conceivable” that
school officials owed a higher duty of protection to students than to
teachers, but also asserted that administrators have more power than
teachers to discipline and control students.164 Peries thus held that,
although administrators “should be” required to stem student-on-teacher
harassment, the administration defendants were not given sufficient
notice to be held liable.165 Therefore, they were entitled to qualified
immunity from Section 1983.166 In other words, the Peries court found
that school administrations have a limited duty to protect their
employees from student harassment, even for teachers whose
identities—racial and national in Peries’ case—are explicitly protected
by Title VII.
The Peries opinion appeared to heavily influence Lovell. The
Lovell court distinguished the conduct of the students from that of the
administration, finding that Lovell would have to show that her
administrators subjected her to discrimination and a hostile work
environment.167 It was not enough to demonstrate that the students
created a hostile work environment motivated by animus and that the
administration did not sufficiently protect Lovell.168 Rather, she would
have to prove that her principal also was motivated by animus, “because
even if he did not know in 2001 that he had to protect Lovell against the
students' discrimination, he is presumed to have known of his obligation
not to engage in such discrimination himself.”169 In making the claim
that the administration would not have known, absent a Supreme Court
holding, that it had a duty to protect its employees from harassment no
matter the identity of the aggressor, the Lovell court in effect set up a
double burden: to pursue successful harassment claims based on
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harassment by students, gay teachers will have to show animus in both
the students and the school officials.170
The propensity in the law to view students as innocent and
passive actors in these cases obstructs teacher claims in another
important aspect. In Peries, multiple students harassed the plaintiff over
a long period of time, and the school defendants claimed the diffuse
nature of the harassment as a defense, arguing, in the words of the court,
that “Dr. Peries submitted a small number of complaints about many
different students, but not enough complaints about any one student to
merit taking serious action such as suspension.”171 Essentially, the logic
the defendants asserted hinged on the assumption that teachers carry
pervasive moral authority at all times and in all situations. The way to
stop this behavior was simply to discipline the individual actors
responsible. If the teacher could not handle the harassment, that said
more about the teacher than the student perpetrators or adult
administrators. If the conduct came from many corners, it was not as
valid. In fact, the more serious and widespread the student-led
harassment became, the more insulated the school was from its
responsibility to remedy it. Luckily for Dr. Peries, the court did not
wholly accept this argument, but instead held that the extent to which
the school took appropriate action to stop the harassment was a question
of fact for a jury.172
The Peries court held that, under Title VII, student harassment
of teachers should be analyzed using a standard similar to that used for
employees harassed by their employers’ customers.173 The Peries court
cited EEOC guidance to find that the degree of responsibility an
employer carries towards its employees is assessed based on whether
the employer “knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to
take immediate and appropriate corrective action.”174 The EEOC
identifies the key factors in assessing employer responsibility as “the
extent of the employer's control and any other legal responsibility which
the employer may have with respect to the conduct of such nonemployees.”175 It also pledges to look “at the entire record: including
the nature of the conduct, and the context in which the alleged incidents
occurred. A determination of whether harassment is severe or pervasive
enough to be illegal is made on a case-by-case basis.”176
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This standard is potentially useful in placing an onus on school
administrations to take effective action to stem student-on-teacher
harassment generally, but it remains a part of Title VII. Lovell’s
importation of Title VII standards into her sexual orientation case will
likely not pass muster in most courts. Her legal creativity has logical,
not legal, force. Further, while the Peries standard is compelling, it
explicitly welcomes a discussion of control, and cases like Tommy
Schroeder’s demonstrate the landmines there. The Supreme Court itself
has declared that schools do not control students, teachers do: “A public
school does not control its students in the way it controls its teachers or
those with whom it contracts. Most public schools do not screen or
select students, and their power to discipline students is far from
unfettered.”177 The logic here is that schools control teachers and
teachers control students. Therefore, if teachers cannot control students,
teachers themselves are fully responsible. Schools have only a limited
duty to control or stop student harassers.
If this calculation seems odd, the addition of sexual orientation
turns it bitter. The long history of stereotypes and bigotry described
above means that sexual orientation harassment presents a unique trap
that anti-gay forces seize to validate stereotypes and perpetuate
intolerance. Namely, a teacher who complains about treatment from
students obviously cannot control them. It is a weakness to lose control
of kids and by extension represents a lack of ability of gay and lesbian
people to be parents—the “effeminate bachelor” and “recruitment”
tropes updated for the 21st century. This ideology teaches children that
gay people are not worthy of respect and therefore cannot properly
exercise authority. It is the bully’s mentality burned directly into the
law: first you cannot control these kids, and now you want to cry about
it?178
The patchwork of legal remedies sought by Schroeder and
Lovell makes plain the legal inadequacy in this area. Plaintiffs
shouldn’t have to put together a Frankenstein monster of precedents and
theories to achieve recognition of their basic rights by schools, parents,
and students themselves. The fact that both Tommy Schroeder and Joan
Lovell tried to import parts of Title VII into their claims for equal
protection demonstrates the need for federal anti-discrimination
protection. It is at best ironic and at worst conspiratorial that the
Schroeder court conflated sexual orientation with sexuality when
assessing classroom culture but made an erudite and nuanced distinction
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between those notions in its legal analysis.179 Schroeder, the court
seemed to say, was only entitled to his identity if it was a problem. The
power of the state only went as far as protecting others from him.
Lovell, on the other hand, was the victim of a school system that simply
had no clear idea of its responsibility to her. Had her skin been another
color, had the epithets used against her been tinged with a different
history of oppression, then perhaps the injuries she suffered would have
been recognized as worth remedying.
VI. (OUT) (OF) CONTROL: TORT LAW’S ENVISAGING OF CHILDREN,
PARENTS, AND SCHOOLS
The sections above demonstrate that, in many ways,
constitutional and civil rights laws are inadequate to render justice
because they largely vacate the responsibility of school officials for
stopping harassment. This section looks at whether tort claims present
a successful avenue for addressing student-on-teacher harassment.
Suits in tort often present victims who have not found redress in other
legal areas with an outlet for remedies. Tort law has two central aims:
first, to inject the actions of people with moral liability and to impose
monetary sanctions when it is right to do so, and second, to promote
social policy that is good not just for the individual wronged, but for
society as a whole.180 In situations of student-on-teacher harassment,
neither conception prevails. While civil rights violations are torts,181
culpability does not necessarily follow. Because of the numerous
intersecting doctrines necessary to assign liability for non-physical torts
committed in school, and the high bar they present in combination, it
appears that tort claims for negligence or intentional infliction of
emotional distress (IIED) do not offer a reliable avenue for relief.
IIED is the most likely tort a teacher who is a victim of student
harassment might rely upon. In allowing IIED claims generally, public
policy recognizes intangible harms such as distress, emotional harm,
anxiety, diminished enjoyment, and loss of autonomy. 182 These torts
represent “the antithesis of happiness or enjoyment of life which
everyone pursues.”183 The conduct alleged in an IIED claim must be
outrageous.184 The only case where a gay teacher who had been
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harassed brought claims for IIED was in Murray v. Oceanside Unified
School District.185 However, in this case it was Dawn Murray’s fellow
employees, not her students, who were the perpetrators. 186 The only
question before the California appellate court that heard her case was
whether her claims for IIED were barred by workers’ compensation
laws.187 The Murray court held that harassment on the basis of sexual
orientation is outside the normal employment environment and, if it is
sufficiently outrageous, is analogous to sexual harassment because they
both “[exceed] all bounds of decency usually tolerated by a decent
society.”188 The fact that students were uninvolved in the harassment,
however, makes this a limited victory for the types of plaintiffs central
to the discussion here.
An example of the challenge involved for teachers in bringing
IIED claims for student-on-teacher harassment outside the school
environment is found in a 2008 decision by the Texas Court of Appeals.
In Draker v. Schreiber, a vice-principal brought suit against two of her
students after the students created a fake social media site in her name
that made lewd sexual comments and, among numerous graphic
references, implied that she was a lesbian.189 After discovering the site,
Draker became worried about the public exposure of her name and
information, given its connection to the lewd material, and experienced
various health problems.190 She alleged defamation and IIED against
the students, and negligence and gross negligence against the parents.191
She lost on all counts.192
The court held that, in Texas, IIED is a “gap-filler” tort, meaning
that it is only available in “those rare instances in which a defendant
intentionally inflicts severe emotional distress in a manner so unusual
that the victim has no other recognized theory of redress.”193 IIED
claims in Texas cannot arise out of the factual basis for any other
claim.194 Draker could not employ any of the facts from her defamation
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claim, which she lost on summary judgment, to assert IIED.195 Justice
Catherine Stone wrote a scathing concurring opinion to the decision in
which she decried the conduct of the students in the case as
“outrageous” but lamented that “there is no civil legal consequence for
the unacceptable conduct. The lack of a consequence is because, in
Texas, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists only
in theory.”196 Texans, she wrote, “would be better served by a fair and
workable framework in which to present their claims, or by an honest
statement that there is, in fact, no remedy for their damages.”197
IIED can, in theory, be employed against parents when they use
their children198 as proxies to inflict harm against others. In Segal v.
Lynch, a father filed a tort claim against his child’s mother for IIED,
charging that the mother had “engaged in extreme and outrageous
conduct designed to poison his relationship with his children. . .”199
Essentially, the father claimed that the mother used the children as a tool
to inflict distress upon him.200 A New Jersey appellate court affirmed
the trial court’s dismissal of the action, holding that the plaintiff’s claim
was barred because it was not in the best interests of the child, but also
affirming that the plaintiff father had “advanced a good faith argument
in support of his legal position in a novel, complex, and heretofore
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relatively unexplored area of the law.”201 To date, it does not appear
that any teacher has sued any parent for employing a child as a tool of
bigotry. However, the notion that children are, as Steven K. Homer has
written, “unregulated conduits of society’s homophobia,” presents a
novel way of examining the ideological relationship between parents
and their children.202
Another possible avenue for teachers seeking protection from
student harassment under tort law is through negligence actions brought
against school administrations. Under the doctrine of in loco parentis,
schools have a duty to exercise the same degree of care toward their
students as would a reasonably prudent parent.203 However, schools are
only liable for injuries that are foreseeable and that are related to the
absence of adequate supervision.204 In this sense, under tort law,
schools are not the “insurers of safety” for students.205 However,
negligence doctrine does appear to acknowledge a stronger connection
between the actions of schools and students than does, for example, Title
VII jurisprudence.
The status of parents under tort law in general is a linchpin for
analyzing negligence within schools. Under common law, parents are
not necessarily vicariously responsible for the actions of their
children.206 However, a parent may be liable for the actions of a child
that the parent fails to control, even if the child is not subject to
liability.207 In essence, the younger and more impressionable the child,
the more control the parent theoretically has to influence the child.208
Nonetheless, parental liability is often more theoretical than real. Even
in cases where minor children have committed violent offenses, courts
have not been quick to assign liability to adults for negligent
supervision.209 To face liability, parents must know of the specific
propensity and occasion of the child’s actions.210 It is not enough if the
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parents know merely that the child is dangerous; they are liable only if
they are negligent in failing to control their children or warn others.211
Courts recognize that teenagers need freedom to develop and consider
older children more difficult to control and more responsible for their
own actions than younger children.212 Thus, the parents of high school
age students are less likely to face liability for the actions of their
children, despite the fact that older children are, in many ways, more
able to inflict emotional damage.213 No matter the age, it is extremely
rare that civil responsibility is assigned to students themselves,
especially for non-violent offenses.214
The difficulty in assigning tort liability against minors is only
exacerbated in the classroom context. For example, in Dinardo v. City
of New York, a special education teacher brought a negligence action
against the city and city board of education seeking damages for
physical injuries she sustained in trying to break up an altercation
between students.215 The teacher, Zelinda Dinardo, had complained for
months to the school that one of the students had been “verbally and
physically aggressive” and expressed concerns for her own safety in the
classroom.216 Her supervisor and principal assured her that “things were
being worked on, things were happening” and told her to “hang in there
because something was being done.”217 The New York Court of
Appeals held that the school’s assurances were too vague to result in a
justifiable reliance by Dinardo.218 The court cited the fact that there was
an ongoing administrative process at the time of the incident as evidence
of Dinardo’s lack of legal recourse.219 Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman
reluctantly concurred, citing a recent New York case that held that
government action must be ministerial, not discretionary, to form the
basis for tort liability.220 He acknowledged the severity of the facts: the
student had threatened to kill the plaintiff and other students, and
Dinardo testified that she wanted to quit as a result of the dangerous
classroom situation.221 Chief Judge Lippman also emphasized the
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existence of a special relationship between teacher and supervisors.222
Liability in this case, he found, was “entirely consistent with the general
tort principle that a defendant should be held liable for the breach of a
duty it voluntarily assumed.”223
Even in cases where the student’s victims have faced severe
physical harm, tort liability has been elusive.224 Proximate causation
may be difficult to prove, debates arise about whether a duty exists,225
claims are barred as a matter of law,226 immunities are assigned,227 and
various technicalities stand in the way.228 For teachers who have been
“merely” verbally abused, as in the cases of Tommy Schroeder and Joan
Lovell, neither IIED claims against parents nor negligence actions
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against schools offer promising avenues to relief. The liability of
children themselves is also extremely tricky. Dobbs Law of Torts
describes the children’s standard of liability as “almost no standard at
all; it holds the child to whatever he can reasonably do, perhaps best
indicated by what he in fact has done.”229 As in other parts of the law,
tort jurisprudence assumes that children are in need of protection; it is
extremely difficult to paint children as perpetrators. Children, like their
parents, are also often judgment-proof.230 The amalgamation of these
standards means that the deterrent function inherent in tort-based civil
protections does not apply to students who clearly see that the
consequences for their homophobic but non-violent actions will result
in, at worst, a few days off school.231
VII.

THE DIALECTICAL CREATION OF SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP

The key to understanding the unique topography of the
secondary classroom is to recognize both the vulnerability of young
people and their power. Children are vulnerable because they emulate
and look up to adults, whom they trust. They are powerful because they
influence adults with their behavior, and because they will soon become
adults themselves. They are not-yet fully formed individuals, but they
are still key members of social communities and discourse. They act
and they are acted upon, they destroy and create, they take power for
themselves and they give it away easily. Unfortunately, the law is often
unable to reflect the complexity of this distinctiveness. It treats students
simply as innocent pawns, vessels that absorb what they are taught,
young and burgeoning minds in need, merely, of protection. It seems
easier for our criminal system to think of a seventeen-year old murderer
as an adult than it does a seventeen-year old bully in school.
The law also does not effectively understand secondary teachers.
It applies to them legal standards developed mostly for students or for
higher education.232 While the law recognizes that in some sense a
teacher’s most basic job is to endure various types of mundane
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harassment on a daily basis, it is unable to assess when a line has been
crossed.233 In a school, it is the adults’ job to demonstrate to students
the borders of acceptability. However, this does not mean students
should not be expected to conform to those perimeters. Teenagers
understand that they are not held fully responsible for their actions, and
they are experts at exploiting that position of power. The line between
acceptable and unacceptable in a public school—between “kids being
kids,” and kids ruining the lives of adults—should not apply differently
to teachers according to their privilege or identity.
The evidence above demonstrates that parents essentially
possess the right to teach their children whatever they want. As they
worry aloud about teachers’ purported influence, some parents exploit
the formative identity of children by closing their minds to tolerance.
The law shields these children when victims seek accountability.
Thankfully, however, children are not just vessels to be filled. They are
also vehicles for changing the beliefs and attitudes of their parents.
They can be liberalizers and liberators from outdated ideologies.
Kenneth Karst writes that older children are often “agents of change”
who can threaten the parent's own identity, as invested in the child.234
Karst describes how young people can “culturally emigrate” from
“parents' morality, from the authority of meanings the parents have
assigned to behavior, even from the parents' religion and their other
group identities.”235
Such a process is presently underway nationwide. Many in the
current generation of teenagers, which contains more openly gay
individuals than any of its predecessors, feel they can only express their
openness while at school.236 (Conversely, the student perpetrators of
sexual orientation abuse have likely not been able to escape the
imprisoning ideology of home; they carry their cage to school). The
fact that they are out for even some portion of their daily lives
contributes to the massive improvement in attitudes towards
homosexuality underway in our society.237 In many ways, children—
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who are elastic, creative, and open—are better equipped than adults to
be the frontline troops in the war on homophobia and heterosexism.
While most of this paper has focused on the ways in which the
law leaves teachers powerless (as one commentator smirked, “If
teachers had such power over children, I would have been a nun years
ago”),238 teachers, of course, do influence students. All teachers, no
matter their sexual orientation, are, in the words of Theresa Bryant,
“critical front-line soldiers in any effort at tolerance education.”239 It
cannot be emphasized enough that tolerance is not just a gay issue.
When bigotry prevails in the classroom, everyone loses. A student
struggling with her own sexual identity and orientation suffers from
witnessing the harassment of a teacher, a straight student must cope with
classmates who express confusing and cruel viewpoints, and the child
with gay parents at home closets her joy and love for her family.240 The
new freedoms claimed by many young people in the internet age also
provide solace and motivation for teachers who did not grow up with
those same opportunities. Students and adults collaborate to make
schools safe places for all community members.
Today’s Anita Bryants must style their superstitions under false
fronts. It is a sign of improvement that today’s anti-gay movement
publicly worries less that gayness will transfer from teacher to student
and more about broader issues such as “procreation” or “family values.”
Today’s anti-gay forces fear that gay people will become an accepted
part of the larger social conversation. They dread that full acceptance
of gay teachers means ascribing inherent value to homosexuality and
making it something that we could actually want to develop in our
children.241 If gay young people don’t exist, then gay role models don’t
either; attempts to maintain the closet for teachers are also efforts to
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destroy the evolution of the values of tolerance on a broader scale.242 If
there is one idea anti-gay forces do not accept, it is not whether gay
people exist (there is treatment for that243), but that being gay can be
fabulous. To combine the joy of youth with a security in being
homosexual is powerfully threatening to those who cling to a rigid
homophobic standard. Two years before Stonewall, the United States
Supreme Court spoke triumphantly of the “marketplace of ideas” on
which “the Nation's future depends.”244 We should champion this idea,
even if the celebration of homosexuality is likely not what the Court—
historically white, male, and ostensibly heterosexual—had in mind. The
cultivation of authentically democratic schools, where development of
healthy gender identity, sexuality, and sexual orientation is encouraged,
threatens established power structures and pushes equality forward in
electrifying directions.
VIII.

THE ROAD AHEAD: RECOMMENDATIONS AND
CONCLUSIONS

Most federal sources of school law perpetuate the closet.
Federal courts have promoted “doctrinal unpredictability and
inconsistency”245 in free expression and equal protection violations
when it comes to sexual orientation, and they have utterly muddled their
interpretations of Title VII “because of sex” discrimination. The United
States Congress declines, year after year, to ratify the Employment NonDiscrimination Act, which would protect employees in large
workplaces from discrimination based on their sexual orientation.246
Only state non-discrimination statutes currently offer any relief to
public employees, including teachers, for harassment based on sexual
orientation.247 For a right as fundamental as the need to feel safe and
secure at work and to be free from open persecution based on an

242

Id.
See Kate S. Thompson, Unchanging: The Battle to Prohibit Sexual Orientation
Change Efforts, forthcoming.
244
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
245
Daly, supra note 232, at 1.
246
Human Rights Campaign, Employment Non-Discrimination Act: Legislative
Timeline, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/employment-non-discrimination-actlegislative-timeline (last visited May 2, 2013). In 2009, President Obama issued
Executive Order 11478, which banned discrimination based on sexual orientation
against all federal employees, as “part of EEOC’s ongoing efforts to provide a model
workplace.” EEOC, Procedures for Complaints of Discrimination Based on Sexual
Orientation, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/internal/sexual_orientation_order.cfm (last
visited Apr. 17, 2014).
247
See Eckes & McCarthy, supra note 16, at 541-52.
243

106
3:1

Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice

[Vol.

essential piece of human identity, state residence should not determine
the chance for relief. Too many states abdicate their responsibility as
gatekeepers of fundamental rights for gay and lesbian people. We need
federal protections for public employees in all states. Until we ratify a
national law like the Employment Non Discrimination Act or add sexual
orientation as a classification protected under Title VII, we will continue
to fail teachers by perpetuating “the last acceptable prejudice.”248
One central question that remains unresolved is why there have
been so few plaintiffs bringing student-on-teacher harassment cases.249
The easiest explanation, of course, is that there have been few incidents.
As tempting as this conclusion may be, embracing it ignores the larger
cultural forces surrounding this issue. Suzanne Eckes and Mary
McCarthy suggest three reasons why there have not been more cases
recently challenging the rights of GLBT educators in general. First,
information on reasons for a teacher’s dismissal or “voluntary”
resignation is not readily available, especially for non-tenured school
personnel.250 Second, most cases settle out of court and do not provide
a paper trail. Third, state and local anti-discrimination protections for
sexual orientation are successful in preventing harassment and
discrimination.251 I suggest, additionally, that the historical legal terrain
in the United States sends a clear message to potential plaintiffs that the
law is stacked against them. As delineated above, statutes do not apply,
precedents do not fit, and courts are at best confused and at worst
homophobic. Class and racial issues also likely contribute.252
Moreover, as Eva DuBuisson writes, when schools are successful in
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preventing speech by teachers, the result is silence. 253 A lack of
litigation does not equate to widespread tolerance or success in the
safeguarding of civil rights in this area.
The best way to solve this issue is for Congress to revise the
Civil Rights Act by adding sexual orientation protections to Title VII.
This solution is the most direct and comprehensive way to provide
fundamental rights nationwide, ensure that gay teachers are free of
harassment and discrimination, and make certain that all students have
access to inclusive curriculums. Because Title VII reform is highly
unlikely, we must rely on other important advances, most pertinently
state and local anti-discrimination statutes. These laws, based on Title
VII but with added protections based on sexual orientation and in some
states also gender identity, provide strong safeguards. They are
problematic, however, because they determine fundamental protections
based on state citizenship.254 Smaller improvements, such as the
elimination of morality clauses from teacher contracts, the inclusion of
union-backed anti-discrimination clauses, and public awareness
campaigns also contribute.255
The impassioned fight for gay marriage also plays a role in
ushering in new rights to LGBT educators, even as the marriage debate
obscures other equality strategies. Despite the recent landmark
Supreme Court decisions in Windsor256 and Perry,257 the classroom is
still a flourishing centerpiece of conservative notions about gay identity.
(If we compare Brown v. Board of Education258 and Loving v.
Virginia259—which came fourteen years later—LGBT activists may
have confused the proper order here260). As many commentators have
pointed out, there are drawbacks to the placement of marriage at the
head of the civil rights agenda.261 While marriage is the “organizing
and stabilizing institution of society,”262 it is also a milieu where
heterosexuals receive a specific and identifiable privilege based on their
sexual orientation. In schools, by contrast, heterosexual people receive
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various advantages, yet their entitlement pervades invisibly. The lack
of explicit recognition of heterosexual privilege in schools means that
the optics of equal protection challenges are less profitable for teachers
than for gay spouses in marriage cases. The disparate treatment across
classifications is also much less stark for Schroeder and Lovell than for
Perry and Windsor. This is why, in the post-Lawrence legal landscape,
we think of gay people as autonomous adults deserving of rights when
we talk about marriage, but that image instantly vanishes when we think
of gay people as teachers.
The risk for teachers of bringing challenges is also higher than
for marriage advocates. The fact that every one of the teachers who
have brought lawsuits in this study had at least fifteen years of teaching
experience probably indicates both the necessary background for
plaintiffs and the exhilaration that comes with pent-up honesty. Like
John Lawrence and Michael Hardwick, Tommy Schroeder and Joan
Lovell were average citizens who chose to fight back when
challenged.263 For teachers of any stripe, however, job security is not a
given, especially in the political climate of the present day. 264 Courts
are a theoretical refuge, but in reality they may be even less protective
than schools. To secure victory, plaintiffs need highly favorable facts
that are not usually available. Teachers pay a disproportionate price for
hard won advances that do not appear, as does marriage, on CNN. The
threat of being fired is still high enough to keep gay teachers on notice
that it is more expedient to carefully cover their sexual orientation than
to embody it.265 A teacher cannot come out of a closet that is locked
from the outside. The closet holds such enormous power because it is
imposed, not chosen. Schools are therefore an example of a locus where
current strategies around LGBT equality are muted in favor of a cautious
incrementalism.266 It is no accident that all of the test cases in this area
emerge from venues north of the Mason-Dixon Line.
The tendency of those who see schools as strategic battlegrounds
for gay and lesbian civil rights is to play a waiting game. Since tolerance
of homosexuality is undergoing a revolution, it makes sense in some
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ways not to fight too hard for tolerance right now, given that younger
generations are becoming increasingly tolerant, and the views of the
nation as a whole are shifting. But before we surrender further ground
in the classroom, it is worth re-examining the lives of our advance
troops. We should think about what working conditions we want for
gay people and what values we want to inculcate in our youth rather
than looking to the law to form our social values. Cultural forces in
public spaces of discourse like classrooms are infinitely more powerful
than the ability of the law to maintain pace with the changing times.267
Recently, Jason Collins, a center in the National Basketball Association,
announced that he is gay. He became the first professional athlete
currently playing in one of the four professional sports to do so. In a
beautifully written article in Sports Illustrated, Collins explained that he
was inspired by President Obama's mentioning of the Stonewall riots in
his second inaugural address, and also by “the grade-school teacher who
encourages her students to accept the things that make us different.”268
If the goal is still that classrooms are incubators of democracy, 269 then
we should be sure to fulfill that promise for our teachers as well.
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